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Abstract
 e principle of non-interference in the internal aff airs of ASEAN member 
states has been identifi ed as among the most signifi cant element that 
shaped ASEAN intra relations and still remain very much appreciated. 
By not allowing member states to interfere into another’s internal aff airs, 
especially into politico-security issues, it has created a stable and secured 
environment in the region which contributed tremendously to the eff orts of 
national building and economic development. However, several regional 
incidents such as the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, the spread of the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Indonesian Smog/Haze crisis and 
the Myanmar internal political quandary have questioned if not shaken 
the belief that the doctrine of non-interference is an untouchable sacred 
political arrangement.  is paper will investigate the genesis of this 
doctrine, the incidents that challenge the doctrine and Malaysia’s readiness 
as a country to lead changes in the doctrine.
 Keyword: ASEAN, Non-interference, Security, Politics.
1. INTRODUCTION
! e Principle of Non-interference into the internal aff airs of ASEAN 
member states has been the long and trusted ‘modus operandi’ since the 
inception of the Association in 1967. ! is method of non-inclusiveness 
relation has gone through several phases of changes in almost all fi elds of 
cooperation except when it concerns political-security issues.
Seminar on National Resilience
36
Malaysia as one of the founding member of ASEAN has expressed its 
support that this principle should be retained in order to create stability 
in the region, which would then contribute to the process of individual 
nation building and national resilience. However, during the course 
of more than forty years of ASEAN existence, the organization has 
expanded and ASEAN has been facing new challenges which needed 
new approaches to managing regional confl ict including relaxing the 
principle of non-interference. ! e question remains, can ASEAN become 
a more interventionist organization, especially when it involves politico-
security matters.
2. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN
! e establishment of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations was 
succeeded from several earlier attempts by diff erent actors in instituting 
some kind of regional cooperation. In 1954, the earliest regional 
cooperation of its sort, the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, 
which was also known as the Manila Pact was being formed.1 However, 
the pact was not inclusive and eff ective enough to survive for long. ! us, 
the formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 
February 1955, was considered as the  more successful attempt to bring 
together diff erent countries from within and outside the region. Despite its 
name, only two Southeast Asian countries (! ailand and the Philippines) 
were willing to join this organization and uniting other countries such as 
the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan.2 
! e organisation being backed by the United States and primarily aimed 
at curbing any communist infl uence in Southeast Asia.3 
1 For a comprehensive discussion on the comparison between the Manila Pact with other 
regional pacts and its appraisal in achieving multiple international objectives in Southeast 
Asia, please refer to Ralph Braibanti (Dec 1957) ‘! e Southeast Asia Collective Defence 
Treaty’, Pacifi c Aff airs, Vol. 30. No. 4. P. 321-341.
2 Refer to Shaun Narine’s ‘Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia’, p. 9-12 
for an elaborate discussion on SEATO and its early history.
3 See George Modelski, SEATO: Its Function and Organization in George Modelski 
(ed), (1962) SEATO: Six Studies for its organisational structure. 
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Despite having Britain and France alongside the United States, SEATO 
never really played any signifi cant role in maintaining regional security. 
For instance, SEATO’s intention to get involve in the Vietnam War was 
rejected by some of its members.4 ! is led to the establishment of the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1959, and then MAPHILINDO, 
the acronym for Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, in 1963. Both 
associations failed due to bilateral rivalry and ineff ectiveness. After the 
failure of these earlier organisations, eff orts to establish ASEAN were 
put into motion by two Malay majority nations in a confl ict – Malaysia 
and Indonesia.5 Indonesia at that time was under the new administration 
of Suharto (as president of Indonesia from 12 March 1967 to 21 May 
1998), and he needed instant recognition after deposing Sukarno. 
However, being the biggest country with the largest population in 
Southeast Asia, Indonesia would not want to be seen as a leader of the 
pact, as meetings were conducted all over the region.6 Malaysia, on the 
other hand, was still under Tunku Abdul Rahman, the fi rst Prime Minister, 
who was an idealist and subscribed to the notion of unity and regional 
cooperation. He was the founding father of Malaya and subsequently 
Malaysia in 1963 and the second president of the United Malay National 
Organization (UMNO) formed by the famous Dato’ Onn Jaafar. Dato’ 
Onn with other Malay nationalists demonstrated against the British 
4 France and Pakistan did not give their support for SEATO to intervene in the Vietnam 
War to the dismay of the Americans. SEATO was created as a part of the Truman 
Doctrine and had the support of President Eisenhower administration in order to curb 
communist expansionism in  Asia.
5 Malaysia and Indonesia put aside their diff erences and assigned top rank government 
offi  cials from both sides to explore the possibility of creating a new regional organisation, 
which would include all Southeast Asian countries. ! is is why the Bangkok Declaration 
of 1967 was just a two-piece paper agreement, which did not specifi cally spell out the 
operational defi nition or charter as the United Nations did.
6 Despite its large share of the total ASEAN population, Indonesia did not seek to play a 
hegemonic role in the new organisation. Meetings rotate between all ASEAN members, 
and organisational costs are equally shared. Indonesia shifted its priority to concentrate 
on internal aff airs. ! ey had to quell an internal uprising and later invaded East Timor 
in 1975.
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government rejecting a proposal of a post British colonial government 
called the Malayan Union and then created the UMNO in 1946.7
Over the years, ASEAN has opened its doors to other states to join them, 
as long as they are located geographically in the Southeast Asia region. 
Its ultimate goal of having all ten countries to join the organisation 
materialised in 1999. ! is achievement, symbolised by its new logo of 
ten rice stalks, was perceived as another milestone accomplishment in 
joining all regional member states into the Association.8 ASEAN could 
now fully concentrate on enhancing economic and political cooperation, 
without having to spend too much time focusing on building up the 
organisation.
Furthermore, some regional countries were also given observer status 
pending fully-fl edged admission, as in the case of Papua New Guinea 
(1976) and Timor Leste’s inclusion into the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) meetings in 2005. Even Sri Lanka campaigned for ASEAN 
membership, to the private distress of the Association’s leadership. Sri 
Lanka’s intentions of joining ASEAN would have been entertained were 
it not for its proximity and its shaky internal politics. ! is enthusiastic 
intention to join the Association is a refl ection of ASEAN’s own 1967 
7 ! e United Malay National Organization (UMNO) was created in 1946 in the wake 
of the British proposal to introduce the Malayan Union, a new centralised British 
government post Second World War. ! e indigenous Malay people saw that the 
proposed Malayan Union was a new form of British colonialism which they sought to 
be independent from especially after the British failed to protech Malaya against the 
Japanese invasion during Second World War.UMNO was the backbone of the Malaysian 
government and has been the governing party from independence until the present day. 
For more information on the Malayan Union, please refer to Albert Lau’s (1991) the 
Malayan Union Conroversy: 1942-1948, Oxford University Press, USA.
8 Initially, ASEAN’s logo has only 5 rice stalks, symbolising the 5 original members. ! e 
new logo, which is in use has 10 rice stalks in it, was introduced in the 1990s following 
its commitment to include all 10 countries in the region of Southeast Asia into the 
organisation. For an elaborate explanation of the logo,  Please visit http://www.aseansec.
org/7095.htm.
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Bangkok Declaration, which opened its membership to all nation states 
in the region.9
Several interested countries have expressed their intention to join 
ASEAN. However, seeing these countries, namely Sri Lanka, Papua 
New Guinea and Timor Leste admitted into ASEAN, it will involve 
a careful and extensive debate among member states, as these countries’ 
locations are not in proximity and are beyond what may be classed as 
Southeast Asia and furthermore, they lag behind current members in 
economic terms.
3. THE ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE
! e non-interference principle (NIP) has been one of the most important 
guidelines for ASEAN internal relations. ! is principle, which is a part 
of the larger doctrine of the ‘ASEAN Way’, has been embedded in all 
ASEAN major documents and continues to be its modus operandi. 
However, as ASEAN membership became larger and the region started 
to experience signifi cant incidents such as the 1997-98 Asian economic/
fi nancial crisis, environmental crises, the suppression of political and 
democratic movements, the global IT and information revolution, and 
the proliferation of human rights movements, the eff ectiveness of the 
non-interference policy in solving regional confl icts has been targeted 
for re-examination.
! e concept of non-interference was fi rst introduced in ASEAN’s 
Bangkok Declaration of 1967. ! is foundation document states that the 
region wanted to be free from outside interference in its internal aff airs 
(Ramcharan, 2000:1). It was further solidifi ed in the ASEAN Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 1971, in Article 2, which acts as a 
9 ! e fourth statement in the Declaration invites all countries in the region of Southeast 
Asia to join the Association. Please refer to ! e Bangkok Declaration, Bangkok 8th 
August 1967. Document found on ASEAN’s Offi  cial Website: http://www.aseansec.
org/1212.htm.
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general guideline for intra regional relationships between states. Among 
other things, the article commits ASEAN member states to have:
mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, • 
territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;
the right of every state to lead its national existence, free from • 
external interference, subversion or coercion; and
non-interference in the internal aff airs of another member • 
states.
One of the most important ingredients in the TAC was the notion of 
states not getting involved in other member states’ internal aff airs. " is 
non-interference principle (hereafter referred to as ‘NiP’) gave an explicit 
assurance that the sovereignty of the member states was guaranteed, 
and that no unwarranted intervention would occur in the event of any 
member states experiencing internal problems. " is arrangement worked 
well until the process of ASEAN enlargement, which meant that a 
bigger organisation would inevitably experience bigger problems. Brunei 
Darussalam became a member of ASEAN on 8 January 1984, Vietnam 
on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997 (in conjunction 
with ASEAN’s 30th Anniversary), and, lastly, Cambodia on 30 April 
1999.
" e Southeast Asian region is no stranger to regional confl ict and 
internal political instability in its member states. With several unresolved 
political and security issues ranging from intra-state tensions to bilateral 
or multilateral confl icts, this region needs an approachable mechanism in 
order to give a clear and acceptable methodology as a guideline for confl ict 
management. Finding solutions for such confl ict lies in the hands of not 
only the confl icting parties, but also regional member states, as trouble in 
one part of the region can have negative ramifi cations for all. 
" e 1997 coup in Cambodia, which saw Hun Sen taking over power 
from Ranariddh, just months before Cambodia’s accession to ASEAN, 
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and the inability on the part of ASEAN as the regional organisation to 
react positively, is a clear indication that it does not have the political 
infl uence to resolve regional confl icts and skirmishes. ! e main reason for 
this shortcoming is the organisation’s strict adherence to the concept of 
‘non-interference’ in member states’ internal problems, which is enshrined 
in the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. ! erefore, there 
must be a way for ASEAN, as the only regional peace and cooperation 
organisation, to be legally involved in such a discord.
What does non-interference mean in ASEAN politics from an 
operational point of view? Acharya (2001:58) explains the four precepts 
of non-interference policy among ASEAN member states as:
Refraining from criticising the actions of the government of i. 
member states towards its own people.
Directing criticism at the actions of states that are perceived to ii. 
constitute a breach of the principle of non-intervention.
Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any iii. 
rebel group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government 
of a neighbouring state.
Providing political support and material assistance to member-iv. 
states in their actions against subversive activities. 
4. REGIONAL EVENTS THAT QUESTIONED THE 
PRINCIPLE
In the history of ASEAN, four major events have tested the Association’s 
non-interference principle, three of which have been relatively settled. 
! ese events are the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, ! e Indonesian 
Trans-boundary Haze Pollution Problem, the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome Epidemic (SARS) and the political unrest in Myanmar. ! ere 
is a fi fth incident, which was the Cambodian issue, but as Cambodia is 
still not part of this Association, it is not necessary to discuss it here. 
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  e fi rst three events have been contained, leaving the fourth as an ongoing 
issue. Political turmoil within Myanmar is still occurring, as hesitance 
persists on the part of ASEAN members to contribute meaningfully 
towards fi nding an amicable solution.
4.1 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis
  ere have been many theories and assumptions made as to why 
the Asian Financial Crisis occurred from the middle of July 1997 to 
February of 1998. Some of the causes identifi ed are poor government 
policies, ineff ective national fi nancial systems and practices, private 
sector debt problems and poor loan quality, rising external liabilities for 
borrowing countries, the pegging of local currencies and the U.S. dollar, a 
global economic slowdown, balance-of-payments (BOP) diffi  culties, and 
changes to the technology used in fi nancial markets.10  e International 
Monetary Fund was also criticised for bad diagnosis and bad prescription 
(Severino, 2002:98).
  e crisis fi rst struck   ailand before snowballing to Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and eventually to South Korea. It 
is widely argued that the crisis started in   ailand with the fi nancial 
collapse of the  ai Baht, caused by the decision of the  ai government 
to fl oat the Baht on 2nd July 1997.  e  ai Baht collapsed after fi erce 
and intense speculations by international hedge funds, which withdrew 
their investments in huge sums after witnessing the local fi nancial system 
crumble.   e   ai economy was overheating, with escalating non-
performing loans due to the rise of interest rates in the U.S. economy.  e 
  ai fi nancial collapse had a domino eff ect in the sense that international 
investors started to withdraw their investments from neighbouring 
Malaysia,   e Philippines, Indonesia and lastly Singapore for fear of 
losing their money.  e Malaysian Premier, Mahathir, put much of the 
blame on international hedge funds and named George Soros as one of 
the biggest culprits (Mahathir, 2000:55).
10 Congressional Research Services report to the U.S. Congress by Dick K. Nanto titled 
‘  e 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis’ at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs-asia2.htm
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  e rise in U.S. interest rates, due to slow economic activity in the States, 
translated into an appreciation of the U.S. dollar.  is meant that local 
banks and businesses ended up with signifi cantly larger debts than they 
initially expected, resulting in borrowing that could not be serviced. To 
make things worse, many of the borrowings were short-term loans for 
long-term investments, for example in real estate and infrastructure 
projects. Claims of nepotism and cronyism were also levelled at the Asian 
Tiger economies, but these were denied (Chang, 1998; Liu, 1999).
Before the crisis, Southeast Asian economies off ered high interest rates 
to foreign investors in order to propel forwards regional economic 
activities. As a direct outcome of this policy, the region experienced high 
infl ows of capital into the economies of  ailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and South Korea, resulting in high growth 
rates of between 8 and 12% GDP in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
  is ‘bubble economy’ amazed the world and earned these countries 
the nickname ‘Asian Economic Tigers’.  e World Bank called these 
countries the ‘miracle economies’ – the model of economic development 
for the rest of the developing world to emulate.11
As a result of the economic downturn resulting from the crisis, the 
governments in Indonesia and   ailand were replaced and a power 
struggle between Mahathir and Anwar transpired in Malaysia.  ailand 
and Indonesia resorted to IMF funds to salvage what they could, which 
amounted to $17.2 and $40 billion, respectively12 Both countries had 
to restructure their economic and fi nancial systems according to IMF 
guidelines, a precondition put in by the international institution before 
funds were released.
11 World Bank, (1993)‘  e East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy’, 
Oxford University Press, New York.
12 By the end of August IMF agreed to provide  ailand with a $17.2 billion standby 
assistance spread over 34 months.  e contributions for the $17.2 billion came from IMF 
($4 billion), the WB and ADB ($2.7 billion), and Japan, Singapore and others ($10.5 
billion).
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Some scholars cite ASEAN’s non-interference principle as a contributory 
factor in this bitter experience. Hadi Soesastro (1999), Stuart Harris 
(1999) and T.J. Pempel (1999), to name just a few, all claimed that 
detection and remedial steps were made impossible due to ASEAN’s 
strict adherence to the non-interference principal. Pempel, for example, 
stated that:
“During the crisis, ASEAN struggled to play a role, but it was not 
equipped institutionally to do so without the voluntary cooperation 
of its members. Most governments resisted any surrender of their 
independence or any modifi cation of the ASEAN non-interference 
principal in domestic aff airs”.13
However, Professor Wing ! ye Woo of the Department of Economics at 
the University of California argued that although it was recognised that 
policy failures by  Asian fi nancial institutions did play a role, fi nancial 
panic among international investors was also to blame. Woo also claimed 
that the introduction of fl awed macroeconomics, which he termed 
‘macroeconomic malpractice of the IMF’, was also a source of failure. 
! e IMF instigated major fi nancial adjustments ranging from hiking 
interest rates to the merging of local fi nancial institutions, which in some 
instances worked while in others did not.
! e late Professor Michael Liefer of the London School of Economics 
and Political Science declared in 2000 that, “ASEAN has been largely 
irrelevant in the economic crisis… ASEAN’s feebleness and disarray 
have diminished its international standing”. ! at statement sums up 
ASEAN’s role in the infamous 1997-1998 East Asian Financial crisis. It 
is argued that if ASEAN members had shared valuable information, for 
instance fi nancially sensitive statistical data, with regional partners the 
severity of the crisis could have been decreased. However, others argue 
13 T.J. Pempel, (1999), ‘Regional Ups, Regional Downs in the Politics of the Asian 
Economic Crisis’ cited in Severino, (2006), ‘Southeast Asia In Search of the ASEAN 
Community’ ISEAS, Singapore.
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that the crisis was imminent due to the nature of speculation attacks and 
panic withdrawals by investors.
Out of the fi ve ASEAN countries, ! ailand and Indonesia were the worst 
hit, while Singapore bounced back within just one year of the incident. 
Malaysia and Singapore resisted the International Monetary Fund’s off er 
of help, which demonstrated their strong economic fundamentals and 
huge reserves.
Nevertheless, the question that remains is could ASEAN have done 
any better in resolving the Financial Crisis? ASEAN as an organisation 
should have done better to remedy the fi nancial situation. In short, it was 
up to individual economies to either dig deep into their own reserves and 
persevere, or decide to borrow from the IMF. Malaysia and Singapore, 
for example, resisted the IMF’s off er; rather, they fell back on their own 
economic fundamentals, huge reserves and strengths to pull through 
the crisis. Other countries such as ! ailand and Indonesia accepted the 
IMF’s fi nancial assistance, which resulted in a massive restructuring of 
their fi nancial systems. 
4.2 Haze Problem
As if the region was not in enough trouble, Southeast Asian countries 
also faced an environmental catastrophe in the form of haze pollution 
originating from the peat fi res in Indonesia. Although some fi res started 
as a result of drought, accidental fi res and acts of nature, it was reported 
that the Indonesian Haze of 1997-1998 was also the result of deliberate 
burning and clearing by plantation corporations, in order to clear the 
lands and make way for mass palm oil and timber plantations (Severiono, 
2006:108). By the end of 1998, it was estimated that some 8 million 
hectares of land had burnt, aff ecting millions of people in the region 
in terms of health and fi nance. It was estimated at the time that the 
fi nancial losses amounted to around $4.5 billion.14 
14 ! e fi res originally only aff ected Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore but by early 1998, 
countries as far as ! ailand and Brunei also felt the eff ects of the haze. For a comprehensive 
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  is was not the fi rst time that such an outbreak had occurred. Serious 
haze pollutions took place between 1982-1983, 1987, 1991 and 1994. It 
was not until 1995, however, that serious and concerted eff orts were taken 
to tackle this reoccurring issue. Indonesia, which was at the epicentre of 
the problem, never rejected any constructive suggestion to curtail the 
magnifying problem. Due to the dire environmental situation, ASEAN 
Environmental Ministers vented their anger and concern. During the 
Environmental Ministers Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan in 1998, the 
Ministers gave their assessments and comments explicitly and offi  cially, 
but not publicly (Severino, 2006:110).  is was done despite Suharto’s 
apology a year before when the same meeting took place in Jakarta. 
Indonesia did not feel off ended, but rather welcomed these criticisms 
which paved the way for a regional permanent task force to deal with 
such problems in the future.
As a result, a Regional Haze Action Plan was agreed by the Ministers 
in 1998, which led to the establishment of the ASEAN Agreement 
on Trans-Boundary Haze Pollution in 2002.  e agreement came into 
eff ect in November 2003 when six ASEAN nations ratifi ed the treaty, 
namely Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, Brunei, Vietnam and  ailand. 
Ironically, however, Indonesia, which was the main state involved in 
this problem, did not ratify and is still to do so. However, the fact that 
Indonesia does not have the ability to tackle this problem alone explains 
why the Indonesian government is ready to absorb the blame and receive 
regional help and assistance.
4.3 SARS Problem
  e Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic that swept 
through Asia was dealt with in a decisive and a timely manner by all 
ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries understood that immediate 
remedial steps should be taken as this epidemic must be contained 
before it could cause further damage.  e fi rst SARS case took place in 
reading, refer to Glover, David & Jessup, Timothy, (2006), ‘Indonesia’s Fire and Haze : 
  e Cost of Catastrophe’ , Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
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Guangdong Province in China in 2002. SARS’ fi rst appearance in an 
ASEAN country was in Vietnam’s Hanoi, brought in by a business man 
who had travelled from the Guangdong Province.
Due to the rapid spread of the syndrome, by April 2003 SARS had 
spread through Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, ! ailand 
and Vietnam. ! is epidemic had negative eff ects on the economy of the 
region, especially within the tourism sector. Singapore, which thrived on 
the tourism industry, saw a rapid decline of up to 74% in terms of tourist 
arrivals at the height of the epidemic15 ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and 
South Korea) meetings were regularly held, and help from the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) was actively sought. Among the drastic 
measures taken to contain the disease were strict border checking at all 
airports, ports and land entry points, the sharing of information over 
newly detected cases and a hotline network among member countries. 
By the end of the epidemic, 282 cases had been recorded within ASEAN 
countries, thirty-fi ve of which were fatal. Most of the fatalities were in 
Singapore and Vietnam16 By June 2003, the ASEAN region was declared 
a ‘SARS-free region’ by Health Ministers meeting in Siem Reap. ! e 
SARS episode in the ASEAN region was tackled in a thoroughly open 
manner, as nobody would benefi t from being infected with such a disease. 
! is incident proves that as long as the issue does not involve political or 
security matters, ASEAN countries are more than willing to cooperate 
and share their information. As this crisis was also a trans-boundary 
problem, similar to the haze pollution incident, it was handled relatively 
transparently compared to the isolated issue of Myanmar
15 ! e Singapore Tourism Board said on Monday that visitor numbers between April 22 
and April 28 had fallen to 32,800, down 74% on the same period last year. SARS killed 
25 Singaporeans and infected 173 more over the past two months. Please refer to BBC 
News, 5 May 2003 accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3001717.stm on 13 
July 2007.
16 http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/2003_4_29/en/
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4.4 Myanmar
Myanmar has been a source of embarrassment to ASEAN, partly due 
to the inability of the Association to fi nd a resounding solution to the 
prolonged episode and partly to the failure of the ruling military junta to 
take heed of the good faith and political persuasion off ered by everyone 
in an attempt to change the political landscape in Myanmar.17 Despite 
numerous appeals by ASEAN and even the United Nations, the military 
regime in Yangon (previously known as Rangoon) has always found 
excuses to maintain the status quo. Myanmar’s persistent rejection to 
any signifi cant political reconciliation with the democratic movements 
has started to become a ‘burden’ and the source of humiliation to other 
ASEAN members (Ganesan, 2006:132). 
" e regime has resisted any political change, fearing that such a shift 
would spell the end to the junta administration. Since its acceptance into 
ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar/Burma18 has disrupted some of ASEAN’s 
relations with other regional countries and organisations. However, 
ASEAN’s insistence on Myanmar’s inclusion in all its activities has 
resulted in attempts to boycotts and disengagement, as well as the 
abandonment of projects.19 
ASEAN’s relations with the EU have been strained due to the latter’s 
position on Myanmar (Petersson,2006:564). " e EU has put much 
17 An interview with Razali Ismail, the special UN envoy to Myanmar revealed that 
Myanmar has never had any serious intention of trying democracy. Its military leaders 
were reluctant to share its power with the democratic parties fearing a backlash in terms 
of retribution and losing power.
18 " e military government changed the name Burma to Myanmar in 1989 in order to 
break away from any colonial legacy. " e name Burma was given by the British when 
in colonised the country.  On 18 June 1989, the military junta passed the ‘Adaptation 
of Expressions Law’ that offi  cially changed the English version of the country’s name 
from Burma to Myanmar, and changed the English versions of many place names in the 
country along with it, such as its former capital city from Rangoon to Yangon.
19 As a result of Myanmar’s inclusion to ASEAN, EU had called off  the 1997 ASEAN-
EU Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting and the problem persist when Myanmar 
offi  cials Visas were not approved for the 1998 ASEM II meeting in London. However, 
after much diplomatic discussion, the EU decided to allow Myanmar to be involve in 
ASEM meeting as an observer (Pattugalan, 1999:49).
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emphasis on the human rights track record when it comes to establishing 
cooperation with third world countries.20 ASEAN’s unrelenting support 
of the junta government is partly to show to the junta that ASEAN is 
working hard to help Myanmar become accepted in the international 
arena in exchange for some sort of political change. However, this eff ort 
has backfi red the Association more than benefi ted it. Myanmar has, 
in most of the time, taken the advantage without repaying it with any 
signifi cant step at restoring political and democratic order in the country 
and engages the NLD purposefully.  
One simple explanation as to why such change has been resisted by the 
military government is that it does not want to lose its grip on power 
and risk the possibility of being tried by its own people once democracy 
is established. Razali concluded that after seeing dictators and military 
governments brought to justice in several parts of the world after 
surrendering their power to the people, the Myanmar government is 
terrifi ed that it will suff er the same fate: “" e way Suharto was being 
charged in court, despite decades of rule over Indonesia has put fear to 
the military junta that the same fate would befall upon them if democracy 
is given a chance in Myanmar”21 " erefore, Myanmar has played with 
ASEAN throughout, without any real intention of changing.
It was obvious to ASEAN governments that after the sudden sacking 
of the Myanmar Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, who showed a 
slight inclination towards change, along with many other top offi  cials, 
the military government in Yangon would not change its attitude as 
anticipated. " e ASEAN strategy of tempting Myanmar with economic 
benefi ts and political support did not bear any fruit. 
20 With the signing of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has put much emphasis 
on the protection of basic human rights, inline with the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). " erefore, doing any 
sort of co operations with a country like Myanmar would violate this convention. To refer 
the convention, go to http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s50000.htm. 
21 Interview with Razali Ismail on 5th April 2007 in Kuala Lumpur.
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ASEAN failed to use the opportunity that arose in 2005 when Myanmar 
took the ASEAN chairmanship from Malaysia. By fi nding ways to 
pressurise Myanmar into changing its domestic policies or risk the 
chairmanship, ASEAN countries eventually coerced Myanmar into 
voluntarily passing the chair to the Philippines. Should Myanmar insist 
on taking the chairmanship, ASEAN risked a series of boycotts by 
America and Europe. ! e Americans announced that they would not 
participate in the forthcoming post-ministerial conference or the ARF 
annual gathering should Myanmar take the chairmanship (Severino, 
2006:140). 
To the relief of the ASEAN countries, Myanmar agreed to pass the chair 
to the Philippines, citing that its priority to tackle the ongoing internal 
reconciliation and democratisation process as the reason for not taking the 
chair.22 ! is decision has been a source of relief to the ASEAN members 
due to the mounting pressures from the international community to take 
some sort of action against Myanmar ( James,2006:163).
In a joint communiqué made on the 26 July 2005, ASEAN, in the 
true spirit of ‘face saving politics’ generously ‘thanked’ Myanmar for its 
understanding and sacrifi ce.
Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Vientiane, 25 July 2005 
We, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN have been informed by our 
colleague, Foreign Minister U Nyan Win of Myanmar, that the 
Government of Myanmar had decided to relinquish its turn to be the 
Chair of ASEAN in 2006 because it would want to focus its attention 
on the ongoing national reconciliation and democratisation process. 
Our colleague from Myanmar has explained to us that 2006 will be a 
critical year and that the Government of Myanmar wants to give its 
full attention to the process.
22 ‘Myanmar Decline to Take Over ASEAN Chair’, New Straits Times, July 27 2005.
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We would like to express our complete understanding of the decision 
by the Government of Myanmar.  We also express our sincere 
appreciation to the Government of Myanmar for not allowing its 
national preoccupation to aff ect ASEAN’s solidarity and cohesiveness. 
 e Government of Myanmar has shown its commitment to the well-
being of ASEAN and its goal of advancing the interest of all Member 
Countries.
We agreed that once Myanmar is ready to take its turn to be the 
ASEAN Chair, it can do so.23
  is incident demonstrated ASEAN’s inability to act decisively in the 
face of a serious confl ict. 
ASEAN’s reputation in the eyes of international politics has been badly 
damaged and confi rmed critics’ appraisals of ASEAN as no more than 
window dressing when it comes to crunch matters. One positive note 
that could be the seed for future actions on Myanmar is the call for the 
expulsion of Myanmar from the Association by Mahathir Mohamad 
during his last days of his premiership (Gunesan, 2006:142).
  e events above have challenged the non-interference principle in 
ASEAN as regional countries have been forced, in some circumstances, 
to accept open criticism and share vital information with neighbouring 
countries.  ese exchanges have not happened before and will presumably 
continue to test how transparent ASEAN countries have been. However, 
ASEAN countries still fi nd it hard to interfere when the issue concerns 
politics and security, as witnessed in the Myanmar example and the 
Indonesian confl ict with Acheh and the breakaway of Timor.
It is obvious from the four issues stated above that ASEAN has been 
an organisation without any consequential infl uence when it comes to 
issues pertaining to human rights, internal politics and the repression 
of democratic movements. Its performance in economic and social 
23 http://www.aseansec.org/17589.htm
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aff airs seems to be better considering both issues do not have any direct 
repercussions on the political powers of member states. ASEAN can only 
hope that change will come from the states themselves, rather than being 
pressured and subjugated by external parties. 
5. ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE NON-INTERFERENCE 
POLICY
Over the years, attempts to alter the original non-interference policy have 
been met with hostility and been diluted. As being discussed above, due 
to its adherence to the non-interference principal, ASEAN has not been 
able to bring much change to areas where the Association has to exert 
its political infl uence forcefully, or where the issue involves politics or 
security. " e Association has been accommodating rather than proactive 
and decisive.
When the Association was confronted with the Cambodian political 
confl ict, it could at least exert some kind of pressure upon Cambodia as 
the communist country was still not part of the Association. Cambodia’s 
membership was postponed not because ASEAN wanted to see a change 
in the political situation in Phnom Penh, but because Cambodia was 
in a state of chaos and did not have a respectable national government. 
ASEAN was reported as being “actively involved, engaged, or intervening 
in Cambodia” (Kim Hourn, 1999:54). As soon as Hun Sen won the 
1998 national elections, ASEAN took no time in extending a renewed 
invitation and accepting the Cambodian government into its fold. " is 
was all in the name of realising the ASEAN 10 objective. 
Eff orts to alter ASEAN’s NiP were started in 1997 by a high-ranking 
ASEAN offi  cial, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister. Anwar Ibrahim’s 
interview with Newsweek International in 1997 mooted the idea of 
‘constructive intervention’ with his fi ve-fold proposal.24 Anwar argued that 
“ASEAN must now move from being a largely reactive organisation to 
24 Anwar Ibrahim, `Crisis Prevention’, Newsweek International, 21 July 1997, p.13.
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one that is proactive”.25 ! e Association should take instant steps before 
the situation in Cambodia erupted into a full-blown crisis. Cambodia 
already had a track record of bloody infi ghting,  which cost the lives of 
more than 1.5 million people.26 
Anwar argued that constructive intervention did not constitute interfering 
into member states’ internal aff airs, as proposals such as fi rming up 
electoral processes, increasing support for legal and administrative 
reforms and strengthening the rule of law were seen as aiding the 
government in need. Intervening in countries in confl ict would also be a 
moral and humanitarian obligation, especially if it meant avoiding loss of 
life and restoring peace and security. However, no follow-up was made 
until almost a year later.
In June 1998, the ! ai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, revived Anwar’s 
proposal in a speech he gave at the ! ammasat University. According to 
Pitsuwan, changing this policy of inactivity and restriction would give 
ASEAN the “…constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic 
issues with regional implication”.27 Pitsuwan made an eff ort to make the 
concept more suitable by changing its name to ‘Flexible Engagement’, 
which was presented at the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in 
July the same year. At the AMM meeting, after rigorous discussion by 
the meeting’s members, only the Philippines supported this idea, but 
ASEAN came to a compromise and agreed to a new, milder formula of 
‘Enhanced Interaction’.
25 Emmers, Ralf, (2003), ‘Cooperative Security and ! e Balance of Power in ASEAN and 
the ARF’, RoutledgeCurzon, London.
26 After taking power, the Khmer Rouge leadership renamed the country Democratic 
Kampuchea. ! e Khmer Rouge subjected Cambodia to a radical social reform process 
that was aimed at creating a purely agrarian-based Communist society. ! e city-dwellers 
were deported to the countryside, where they were combined with the local population 
and subjected to forced labour. About 1.5 million Cambodians are estimated to have 
died in waves of murder, torture, and starvation, aimed particularly at the educated and 
intellectual elite. Refer to David P. Chandler: A History of Cambodia (Westview Press 
2000) and Ben Kiernan: How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and 
Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975 (Yale University Press, Second Edition 2004)
27 Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, `! ailand Foreign Policy During the Economic and Social Crisis’, 
presented  at ! ammasat University, 12 June 1998, p.6.
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So many names have been given to this new format of regional 
interaction. Among others are ‘Flexible Engagement’ and ‘Constructive 
Engagement’. However, such a discussion does not take place in ASEAN 
offi  cial meetings such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) 
and the ASEAN Summit; rather, the matter is discussed separately 
before or after such meetings. " ese gatherings are termed as ‘retreats’ 
which connotes the relaxed, informal and frank nature of discussions 
(Katsumata, 2004:2). During the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2002, 
the Foreign Ministers “…reaffi  rmed the usefulness of informal, open and 
frank dialogue… to address issues of common concern to the region”.28 
" e fact that ASEAN members resist institutionalising a change in the 
approach to the discussion of internal matters relating another member 
clearly shows the uphill task faced and the inability of ASEAN to 
change its original formula of non-interference. One reason may be that 
all member states are still in the process of nation building, even after 
decades of independence.
However, the fact that ASEAN has opened a new avenue to discuss issues 
of concern to all, although informally, marks a degree of shift in its non-
interference policy. " e non-interference principal has been interpreted 
in a more fl exible way,29 but does this shift from being overtly sensitive 
to being a bit more receptive an indication of change, as these retreats 
are informal meetings and do not have any binding resolutions? Simon 
Tay & Jesus Estanislao (2001) and Herman Kraft (2000) defended 
these retreats, stating that they do make a diff erence in the way ASEAN 
countries view regional confl ict. " e authors attribute such a paradigm 
shift to the 1997-1998 Economic Crisis, the Indonesian Haze problem, 
drug traffi  cking problems and trans-boundary crime, which all fall under 
the spheres of economic, fi nancial and social issues rather than politics 
and good governance.
28 ASEAN Joint Communique, the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bandar Seri 
Begawan, Brunei, July 29-30, 2002.
29 Hiro Katsumata,(April 2004), ‘Why is ASEAN Diplomacy Changing: From “Non-
interference” to “Open and Frank Discussion?” Asian Survey, University of California.
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Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and even Singapore 
have been less than enthusiastic about changing the modus operandi of 
intra-regional cooperation. ! is passive stand was again shown during 
the 2007 ‘Saff ron Revolution’, which was led by thousands of monks, 
who received harsh retaliation from the Myanmar military government.30 
According to media reports, anti-government protests started on August 
15, 2007 and have been ongoing since that time. ! ousands of Buddhist 
monks started leading protests on September 18, and were joined by 
Buddhist nuns on September 23. On September 24, 20,000 monks and 
nuns led 30,000 people in a protest march from the Golden Shwedagon 
Pagoda in Yangon, past the offi  ces of the opposition National League 
for Democracy (NLD) party. Comedian Zaganar and national TV star 
Kyaw ! u brought food and water to the monks. On September 22, the 
monks marched to greet Aung San Suu Kyi, a peace activist who had 
been under house arrest since 1990.31 
In the midst of the confl ict, the United Nations sent Ibrahim Gambari 
to assess the situation on the ground, and to discuss ways to resolve the 
tension with the ruling junta. ! e Myanmar state media said that all but 
ninety-one of the nearly 3,000 arrested in the crackdown were released. 
Ibrahim Gambari criticised the closing of the monasteries, yet was 
assured that the crackdown would stop.32 
! e Myanmar junta is still struggling with the democratic movement 
led by Suu Kyi. At the time of writing this thesis, the latest situation 
30 ! e Saff ron Revolution was launched as the immediate response to the unannounced 
decision of the ruling Myanmar junta, the State Peace and Development Council to 
remove fuel subsidies which caused the price of diesel and petrol to suddenly rise as much 
as 66%, and the price of compressed natural gas for buses to increase fi vefold in less than 
a week.
31 http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ivO0AtyBkmFxEVb3xG3xpzLlpGIQ  
accessed on 3 March 2008
32 News at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-myanmar-monastery.
html accessed on 4 March 2008.
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in Myanmar is a bit tense with the current trial of Suu Kyi.33 For the 
fi rst time, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has personally visited 
Myanmar and discussed the issue with General ! an Shwe, the junta’s 
chief.34 Despite assurances given by the General that the coming elections 
will be free and fair, the international community cannot escape its 
pessimism about the current situation (Fawthorp, 2009:27).
6. MALAYSIA AS A REGIONAL PLAYER
Malaysia has proved time and again that it can play a signifi cant role, if 
it wishes to, in infl uencing and at times leading regional co-operations. 
Almost all if not all past Malaysian Prime Ministers have devoted 
signifi cant eff ort and time in pursuing the dream of building a more 
cohesive and strong regional co-operation via ASEAN. Not forgetting 
the fact Malaysia is among the founding members of ASEAN, it has also 
played important roles in shaping ASEAN foreing policy and economic 
co-operations.
6.1 Tun Razak and ZOPFAN
Notably, Razak’s marked achievement in regional politics was the proposal 
for the neutralisation of the region in 1971. ! e November 1971 Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality showed 
how serious he was in promoting  regional peace and security, which 
would create a conducive environment for nation building to take place. By 
successfully persuading ASEAN countries to take a neutral stand during 
the height of the Cold War, Razak succeeded in portraying Malaysia’s 
stature as an important regional political player. By being neutral as well, 
Malaysia would be able to build relationships with both the West and the 
33 Suu Kyi is currently on trial and has been handed an 18 month House Arrest for 
allowing John Yettaw, an American who swam across he lakeside house in May 2009. 
Her latest trial has sparked international criticism and considered as a plot by the military 
junta to disallow her from taking part in the coming Myanmar General Election. Yettaw 
himself was sentenced to seven years of hard labour, but has been released by the junta 
upon a high profi le visit by US Senator Jim Webb and was fl own back to the United 
States. Senator Webb is a strong proponent of engagement with the military government 
which obviously receives strong objections from Myanmar’s political and civil groups.
34 Tom Fawthorp, (2009) ‘ASEAN’s Burmese Diplomacy Has Failed’, Guardian, 27 July 
2009.
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East at the same time. Malaysia, and to some extent other countries in 
the region, would enjoy the liberty to trade with any state that it wished 
to, without being subjected to political intimidation and infl uences. 
Razak’s untimely death on 14th January 1976, at the age of 54, was a 
hugely unpleasant surprise to everyone. His early death explained why 
he was always so precise in setting up his political objectives – all the 
time in a rush – followed by signifi cant steps towards the realisation of 
his plans.35 
6.2 Tun Hussein and Regional Issues
On the regional front, Tun Hussein, like other regional leaders of his time, 
was preoccupied with the threat of Vietnamese-Soviet expansionism. 
With the devastating withdrawal of the American forces from Vietnam 
in 1975, the Southeast Asian region became vulnerable and intimidated 
by the communist expansion to other parts of the region, especially after 
Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea) in January 1979.36
Tun Hussein and his ASEAN counterparts lobbied at the United Nations 
that Cambodia’s chair at the UN should remain and be represented by 
the exiled Democratic Kampuchea government (Means, 1991:77). Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk was entrusted to head the exile government and fi ght 
for Cambodia’s independent from outside.37 Sihanouk, regrettably, had 
35 Tun Abdul Razak suff ered a long-fought leukemia illness but succeeded in keeping it 
a secret. When his condition worsened in December 1975, he announced that he was 
having a ‘holiday’ in London, the place where he passed away.  For a brief biography on 
Tun Razak, please refer to Shaw, W. (1976) ‘Tun Razak: His Life and Times’, Longman 
Publishing Group, Kuala Lumpur.
36 Vietnamese forces invaded Kampuchea (Cambodia) on 7th January 1979, in order to 
overthrow the Khmer Rouge government. " is ended the Cambodian genocide from 
1975-1979 under the rule of Pol Pot which was being supported by the Chinese. Vietnam 
aligned with the Soviets with the signing of the 1978 ‘Friendship Treaty’.
37 Prince Sihanouk lived in exile in China and North Korea after the fall of Cambodia. 
In 1982, he became president of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK), which consisted of his own Funcinpec party, Son Sann’s KPNLF, and the 
Khmer Rouge. " e Vietnamese withdrew in 1989, leaving behind a pro-Vietnamese 
government under ex-Khmer Rouge cadre Hun Sen to run the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK). For a brief biography of the Prince, please refer to Osborne, Milton 
E. (1994) ‘Sihanouk Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness’. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press.
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to join forces with the Khmer Rouge, whom had forced his resignation a 
year before, to form a formidable force against the Vietnam-backed Pol 
Pot government.
As the threat of Vietnamese expansionism became more apparent, 
and ASEAN countries saw the incidents of Vietnam’s incursions into 
! ailand in their eff ort to uproot rebellion forces at the borders, Tun 
Hussein and President Suharto jointly organised a meeting in Kuantan.38 
! e ‘Kuantan Principle’ was announced in March 1980, which stated 
that China and the Soviet Russia should refrain from involvement in 
Southeast Asia, and called for a political solution to the Cambodian 
problem (Teik Soon, 1982:553). As ! ailand became more restless 
with the threat from Vietnamese-Cambodian attacks, Tun Hussein 
announced in October that year that Malaysia would come to ! ailand’s 
rescue should the Kingdom be attacked. Tun Hussein also sent his 
Foreign Minister to visit Hanoi in January 1981 to show that Malaysia, 
although serious about wanting Vietnam to vacate Cambodia, was at the 
same time more fl exible in approaching the problem.39 
Malaysia was aff ected directly by the war in Cambodia, as it had to 
accept more than 38,000 refugees from that part of the world. Most 
Cambodians taking refuge in Malaysia were Muslim Cambodians, 
making the decision to help and house them far more complex. Malaysia 
38 ! ailand and ASEAN countries were alarmed at the Vietnamese incursions into 
! ailand in June 1980 and again in January 1981. On the latter occasion, the ! ai 
government protested the incursion by Cambodia-based Vietnamese troops and the 
deaths of two ! ai soldiers. ! ere was another incident involving Vietnamese and ! ai 
troops at the end of January 1981 when a ! ai soldier was killed during the skirmishes. 
For additional discussion, please refer to Lau Teik Soon ( Jun 1982) ‘ASEAN and the 
Cambodian Problem’, Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 6.
39 ! e delegation to Hanoi was to show that Malaysia was taking a fl exible approach in 
fi nding solutions to the Cambodian invasion. But it was reported that the visit was a 
failed mission as Vietnam was adamant on supporting the Heng Samrin government that 
they had placed therein. Vietnam maintained that they acted on behalf of Heng Samrin’s 
request. Vietnam also saw that as long as there was a Chinese threat in Indochina, they 
could possibly play the stabiliser role, and their existence in Cambodia was important to 
maintain peace and security to the region. Unless China’s threat was removed, Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia would continue.
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had to accept them in the name of Islamic brotherhood, which of course 
would make the decision acceptable to the Malay-Muslim majority of 
the country (Abu Bakar, 1990:83).
6.3 Tun Mahathir and ASEAN
“I am a Malaysian nationalist. For this I off er no apologies. I am 
also an ASEANist. I am deeply committed to ASEAN, which has 
played such a critical role in turning what was an area of turmoil, 
antagonism, confl ict…into a zone of cooperative peace and prosperity” 
(Dr. Mahathir Mohamad at the Asia Society Conference on Asia and 
the Changing world, Tokyo, Japan, 1993).40 
Mahathir was one of the ASEAN leaders who categorically stated his 
appreciation of ASEAN as the driving force behind stability in the region. 
To Mahathir, ASEAN had a stabilizing infl uence and acted as a catalyst 
in developing national economic resilience in the Southeast Asian region. 
Consequently, ASEAN remained at the forefront of Malaysia’s foreign 
policy priorities during Mahathir’s premiership (Makarudin, 2004:viii).
Mahathir saw that the economic development, harmony and safety 
enjoyed by ASEAN countries for the previous forty years or so were 
as a result of successfully maintaining a peaceful, secure and business-
friendly environment in the region. ASEAN made it possible for these 
countries to enjoy such an environment by abiding to the principles of 
ASEAN neighbourliness, a policy of non-aggression, non-interference 
into internal aff airs, and the successful avoidance of escalated confl ict.41
40 For a selection of Mahathir’s speeches and ideas on ASEAN, refer to Mohamad, 
Mahathir, (2004), ‘Refl ections on ASEAN’, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur.
41 It was obvious that Mahathir was indebted to the organisation from all of his speeches 
given over the years. In his fi nal and departing speech at his last ASEAN Summit in 2003, 
he urged that the remaining ASEAN leaders uphold the non-interference principal, the 
consensus-based decision making, national and regional resilience, respect for national 
sovereignty, and the renunciation of the threat and the use of force in the settlement of 
dispute. " ese are the ASEAN norms and the ASEAN Way that have served ASEAN 
countries well. He reiterated again Malaysia’s total commitment to the Association, 
having been one of the founding members of the organisation.
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Mahathir always reminded ASEAN leaders of the need to implement 
every planned project and programme rather than making rhetorical 
announcements for the benefi t of the press. In his speech addressed to 
the 29th ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting in Petaling Jaya, he urged 
all the delegates to remain focused in pursuing ASEAN objectives in 
economic and trade sectors, and start addressing issues that confronted 
them.42
Malaysian foreign policy towards ASEAN and regional cooperation 
was nothing short of a full commitment, as Malaysia realised that in 
order for Malaysia and other states to achieve economic and political 
development, the region itself must off er a conducive and favourable 
environment. ASEAN succeeded in keeping bilateral confl icts at bay by 
not including them in any offi  cial meeting agendas. Malaysia’s insistence 
in keeping the status quo as it was, and remaining true to the concept of 
non-interference and the non-use of force in settling disputes, bore fruit, 
as ASEAN countries have successfully avoided any military confl ict 
since its inception in 1967. # is alone is a milestone achievement for 
ASEAN.
7. CONCLUSION
Can Malaysia Lead the Change to a more Interventionist ASEAN
From the discussions above, it is clear that Malaysia can lead the way 
towards amending the Principle of Non-interference as long as it has 
the political will to do so. Malaysia has demonstrated that it could be an 
agent of change as it has done by sponsoring the ZOPFAN treaty, various 
economic co-operations, ASEAN expansionism process which saw its 
membership extended from 5 to ten and of course several other regional 
co-operation initiatives such as the setting up of ASEAN regional anti-
terrorism center in Kuala Lumpur. # e challenges that ASEAN countries 
faced during the ASIAN Economic Crisis, the SARS pandemic and the 
Indonesian Haze/Smog incident have distinctively prove that we have to 
42 A speech delivered at the 29th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting in Petaling Jaya, 
on October 16, 1997.
Political Managements and Policies in Malaysia
61
be more open in discussing certain national issues especially when it has 
an adverse eff ect to our neighbors. " e Myanmar problem still remain 
unsettled and has become a source of embarrassment to ASEAN.
In an interview with Tun Mahathir in 2007, he agreed that ASEAN 
could have done more in managing regional political confl icts such as 
the Myanmar confl ict but the problem was as to how could ASEAN 
amend the doctrine of non-interference and to what extent could we 
intervene. How can Malaysia itself as a country that has been upholding 
the doctrine of non-interventionist be able to persuade its neighbors to 
relax a bit and be brave enough to include others in discussing regional 
issues frankly and openly? His main concern was what would be the 
demarcation line between intervening and not intervening and who could 
give that defi nition. " is exercise could open a fl ood gate of confusion 
and create uneasiness among ASEAN member states especially the more 
newer members which are basically having socialist background such as 
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia.
Malaysia has her own political baggage which would prefer the 
principle of non-interference upheld rather than amended. Issues such 
as the affi  rmative actions for the Malays, Malay special rights and 
the protection for the Malay rulers are among the main concern and 
points of contestation. However, with the launching of the 1Malaysia 
slogan by the current Malaysian Prime Minister and several economic 
liberalization policies which would do away with protectionism and 
Malay quotas may mean that Malaysia is moving towards a more liberal 
and inclusive government compared to the previous ones. It is hoped 
that Malaysian leaders would have the political will to see through these 
changes which than would be refl ected into a more frank and relaxed 
regional cooperations when it comes to the implementation of the non-
interference principle in ASEAN. 
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